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Iraq: No Consensus, No Constitution

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Original story found here.

Iraqi negotiators are as likely to agree on a constitution by Monday’s new deadline as American troops are likely to leave Iraq anytime soon. If leaders ultimately fail to reach a consensus, however, we could end up occupying Iraq for years if not decades to come.

It is hardly surprising that Iraqis are so divided. Any notion of pluralism, let alone democracy, is not only new to Iraq; it threatens to upset a regional balance of power that has lasted for centuries.

In a nation as inequitable and discriminatory as Iraq long has been, forging a consensus looks as difficult as the effort to end apartheid in South Africa was. This example shows, perhaps, that peace in Iraq may one day be possible — but not until after at least its three largest sides have fought it out hard and long enough to learn that compromising is their only remaining option.

We might never have invaded their nation if we had known how hard it would be for Iraqi groups to get along with each other. Much has been said about the Bush administration’s failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, after it alleged, along with most media, that they were there. But few people seem to realize that the administration and the same media together also planned an invasion for a fantasy nation.

In the years and months building up to the 2003 invasion, leading publications and columnists in the U.S. somehow wished Iraq’s toughest internal problems away.

A basic error in the reporting of Iraqi demographics gave a confusing and inaccurate portrayal of the country. In the 1990s, The Washington Post repeatedly described Iraq’s majority Shias as a “minority.”

In 1999, the journal Foreign Affairs published an article saying that Iraq’s big problem after Saddam Hussein will be helping its “Sunni majority” keep its Kurdish and Shi’a minorities from pulling away.

A 2002 op-ed by Henry Kissinger in The Washington Post warned that after Hussein, Iraq’s “Sunni majority” would need our help keeping the Kurdish and alleged Shi’a minorities in line.

Eight months before the invasion, William Safire, in The New York Times, downsized the so-called Sunni majority to a “plurality.”

Now, everyone knows that neither Iraq’s Sunni Arabs nor the country’s (Sunni) Kurds comprise more than 20 percent — at most — of the nation’s population, while nearly two-thirds of Iraqis are Shia Arabs.
By inflating the long politically dominant Sunni Arabs into an alleged majority, while downsizing the long-oppressed Shia Arabs into a so-called minority, the media allowed the administration to sidestep
the all-important question of what might happen to Iraq after Hussein.

The irony of this blind spot in the pre-invasion debate is that the same facts have played a role in our Iraqi policy before.

Back in 1991, after then-President George H.W. Bush repeatedly encouraged Iraqis to “toss aside” Hussein, he and his administration watched Iraq’s elite forces crush the very uprisings — by both the Shi’as in the south and the Kurds in the north — that they helped inspire. He and members of his cabinet later admitted that they did so because they feared the consequences of either Iraq’s Shi’a majority or Kurdish minority gaining more power.

Today, President George W. Bush still promises to bring democracy to Iraq, while adding earlier this week that he is optimistic that the Iraqis trying to negotiate a constitution will reach a consensus. That might have been easier if the fantasy nation that many pro-war experts, opinionists and pundits described before the invasion really existed. But the reality of Iraq is that the Shi’a majority is finally gaining the power that arguably it has long deserved, while the Kurdish minority is intent on preserving its hard-earned autonomy, if not breaking away from Iraq outright.

The Sunni Arab minority, meanwhile, is losing the power that it long has enjoyed out of proportion to its numbers.

It is possible to negotiate settlements to even the most entangled hostilities, as events in places as diverse as El Salvador, South Africa and Northern Ireland all show. But parties in each one of these conflicts only came to the table willing to make a deal after they more than flexed their military muscle. The bloody headlines coming out of Iraq every day show that Iraq’s Sunni Arabs still have plenty of muscle to flex. Many of them will keep on fighting to try and either restore themselves to power or at least strengthen their hand.

After Iraq’s Wartime Elections

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Original story found here.

Robert Fisk is the award-winning journalist of the London-based Independent newspaper, and he has long been a consistent critic of American imperial policies in the Middle East. “But it was the sight of those thousands of Shi’ites, the women mostly in black hejab covering, the men in leather jackets or long robes, the children toddling beside them, that took the breath away,” he reported from Baghdad on election day. “If Osama bin Laden had called these elections an apostasy, these people, who represent 60{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} of Iraq, did not heed his threats.”

The failure of the U.S.-backed election in Iraq is not that it was illegitimate for most Iraqis but that the exercise has only deepened Iraq’s sectarian divisions and perhaps moved the country closer toward the specter of a full-scale civil war. Progressives should remain critical of the January 30 election but not for the reasons that most have articulated so far. Many anti-war critics were so busy pooh-poohing the balloting as a farce engineered by the Bush administration that they forgot that Washington had only agreed to the election under Iraqi Shi’ite pressure. The first U.S. plan for Iraq was to hold indirect elections through regional caucuses, a process that would have lent itself far more easily to American manipulation. But Iraq’s Shi’ite grand ayatollah, Ali Sistani, and other Iraqis said no.

Actually, the election results are not likely to enhance American influence over Iraq. According to the reliable Arab-run polling firm, Zogby International, more than two-thirds of Iraq’s Shi’ites want U.S. forces out of Iraq either immediately or once the elected government is in place. That goal may be unrealistic, since any sudden withdrawal of U.S. forces could well plunge Iraq into civil war, but it underscores that the election was a step forward for Iraqi sovereignty, despite the conditions of U.S. military occupation in which it took place. U.S. progressives could help Iraqis reach their goal by ensuring that a transfer of power actually occurs.

Only last month, David Ignatius, a columnist for The Washington Post, complained that by going ahead with the election the Bush administration would “help install an Iraqi government whose key leaders were trained in Iran.” He went on to say “in terms of strategy,” the Bush administration “is a riderless horse.” In other words, the administration’s original plan to install the Iraqi exile, Ahmad Chalabi, as a proxy to control both the Iraqi people and their oil has failed, and now the administration is finding its own rhetoric catching up with itself in last Sunday’s election in the form of an expected Shi’ite victory.

Many if not most progressives, however, have downplayed Iraq’s sectarian divisions, since to acknowledge them might lead one to admit that the anti-American insurgents are drawn mainly from the nation’s long-privileged Sunni Arab minority constituting less than 20{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} of the Iraqi population. (The 2001 U.S. State Department Human Rights report on Iraq, released in 2002, reported that Sunni Arabs represented 13-16{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} of the Iraqi population.) During Saddam Hussein’s regime, Sunni Arabs dominated not only the ruling Ba’ath Party but also the Iraqi military’s officer corps and elite troops.

Strange Bedfellows

Ironically, anti-war activists who discount the divisions in Iraq find themselves bedfellows with senior Bush administration officials like Steve Hadley, the new White House national security adviser. In a Washington Post op-ed article one day before the Iraqi election, Hadley, too, pooh-poohed the notion that Iraq’s sectarian splits really matter. Unlike Hadley, U.S. progressives feel that the nonparticipation of Sunni voters casts a pall on the election. But what most progressives are still reluctant to concede is that for most Shi’ites and for nearly all Kurds, who together amount to at least 80{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} of the population, the election did matter.

Of course, Iraq’s sectarian tensions should not be overblown, and they have far more to do with political power than with either religion or ethnicity. In Baghdad, Sunnis and Shi’ites have often intermarried and lived side by side in peace. But it is undeniable that for decades both Shi’ites and Kurds, albeit in different regions, collectively fought against and were persecuted by Saddam’s Ba’athist government. As the respected Middle East expert Juan Cole, a major critic of the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq, wrote in his most recent book:

“Probably a majority of Shi’ites joined the ranks of the opposition in the fateful spring of 1991 when, in the wake of the defeat inflicted on the regime by the U.S. and its allies, Shi’ites in Najaf, Karbala, Basra and elsewhere rose up against the Ba’ath. The regime’s retaliation was brutal and effective, leaving countless casualties (rumors of 40,000 dead in Karbala alone have reached me from Iraqi expatriates). More recently, the Iraqi government has waged ecological war on the marsh Shi’ites of the south, draining their swamps and forcing tens of thousands of them to flee to Iran.”

Many American progressives have never acknowledged the tragedy of the failed spring uprisings in 1991, what countless Iraqis at the time called their anti-Saddam intifada. During and after the 1991 Gulf War, then-President George H.W. Bush repeatedly urged Iraqis to oust Saddam and “toss him aside.” Within weeks, a full-scale insurgency was under way both south and north of Baghdad. “Saddam Hussein faces his most serious political challenge in more than 20 years in power,” wrote the CIA in a secret report in the middle of the month-long uprisings. “Time is not on his side.”

Anti-Saddam rebels­ dominated by both Shi’ites and Kurds­fought for weeks after the 1991 Gulf War in 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces, but Saddam’s remaining helicopter gunships, tanks, and elite forces eventually wiped them out. Why did the Bush I administration abandon the rebellion that it helped to inspire? In their joint memoir, George H.W. Bush and his then-national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, wrote: “We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf” and the possibility of “[b]reaking up the Iraqi state.”

According to this logic, the January 30 election represents a triumph not for the United States but for Iraq’s Shi’ite majority, which is now moving toward the kind of self-empowerment and self-determination that it has long deserved. Progressives familiar with Iraqi history can understand why neither Shi’ites nor Kurds have much love for Sunni Arab Ba’athists, thousands of whom are currently anti-American insurgents. But some anti-war figures, like novelist and activist Arundhati Roy, have not only minimized the roots of today’s indigenous Iraqi insurgency but have unabashedly apologized for the indiscriminate use of violence against Iraqi civilians. “[I]f we were to only support pristine movements, then no resistance will be worthy of our purity,” said Roy in a speech in San Francisco last summer.

Anti-war activists like Roy have long championed the poorest of Iraqis, whose children suffered the most in the 1990s under U.S.-backed, UN economic sanctions. But how many of these same anti-war activists have been willing to acknowledge that most of these Iraqis were Shi’as and that they suffered domestically under Saddam?

Other progressives have­ perhaps unwittingly­ become bedfellows with bigots who stereotype Shi’ite Muslims, unfairly painting Iraq’s Shi’ite Arab majority as an alleged tool of Shi’ite Persian clerics who dominate neighboring Iran. This may be a convenient cheap shot at the Bush administration, but it is based on ignorance. Scholars like Moojan Momen, author of the first major English-language text on Shi’ite Islam, Yitzhak Nakash, who wrote the first study of Iraqi Shi’ites, and Juan Cole have documented that Iraqi Shi’ites have their own particular history, long competing for influence with Iranian clerics. If anything, Iraq’s Shi’ites are likely to assert themselves even more if given the chance.

The one Iraqi Shi’ite group that has been lauded by some anti-war columnists is the al-Mahdi militia led by the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. His father­, a widely revered cleric­, and two brothers were all murdered by Saddam, whose administration tortured and killed hundreds of Shi’ite clerics. The young al-Sadr later ordered his followers to rise up against U.S. troops after the chief U.S. occupying authority in Iraq, Paul Bremer, closed down his movement’s newspaper. The irony of progressives’ support for al-Sadr is that he is among the most socially reactionary of Iraq’s Shi’ite leaders (he has not earned the status of cleric) and has, in his opportunistic search for allies, reached out to the misogynist, anti-democratic mullahs who run Iran. The most respected Iraqi Shi’ite cleric, Ali Sistani, is Iranian-born, but he has consistently sought to keep theology and politics at least somewhat separate in a “quietist” tradition based on ancient Shi’ite scriptures, unlike the modern ruling Shi’ite theocracy in Iran.

Iraq is still a bloody mess, and the choice now for both Iraq’s elected government and the United States is whether to pursue a military victory over the insurgents or to reach out to them and to Iraq’s Sunni Arab community to negotiate a settlement of the ongoing conflict. U.S. progressives should support attempts at reconciliation in order to minimize further bloodshed.

The El Salvador Parallel

The wartime experience in El Salvador is instructive, although not in the ways that senior Bush administration officials like Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld contend. Both men claim that U.S.-backed elections in El Salvador helped defeat the rebel insurgency. What they forget is that El Salvador’s civil war went on for 10 years after the country’s first election, and that what ended the war was not an election but the joint decision by the Bush I administration and El Salvador’s second elected government to finally stop trying to eliminate the rebels and instead pursue a negotiated settlement.

Nor is the Central America experience instructive in the way that some anonymous Pentagon officials have recently suggested, when they leaked to Newsweek the idea that at least some U.S. military planners in Iraq now want to promote Iraqi death squads based on their experience in the 1980s in El Salvador. (Anyone wishing to thoroughly explore this story should see David Holiday’s Central America blog) The use of such dirty tactics in Iraq would be one sure way to turn the current level of sectarian violence into a bloodbath with U.S. troops stuck in the middle, perhaps fighting both sides.

What progressives forget when comparing El Salvador and Iraq is that El Salvador’s insurgents were nearly all Marxists of one stripe or another. In contrast, Iraq’s anti-American insurgents are nearly all right-wingers of one stripe or another­either Sunni Arab nationalists or Islamic Wahaabi fundamentalists­and despise most Iraqi leftists, including the Iraqi Communist Party. U.S. Labor Against the War and the Iraqi Communist Party have recently denounced the murder of a leader of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions, Hadi Salih, by what both groups suggested were Ba’athist insurgents. The Iraqi Communist Party participated in the January 30 election, faring better than many Western progressives and Bush administration officials expected. Kurdish candidates also fared well, given their small numbers, and Shi’ite candidates led the pack.

It is time for Westerners of all political persuasions to finally start seeing Iraq’s richly diverse people for who they are instead of kicking them like footballs to try to advance a political agenda.

Next test: insurgents

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Original story found here.

The Bush administration looks like it has finally scored a ringing success in Iraq.

But, if one objective of Sunday’s elections was to help defeat Iraq’s ongoing insurgencies, then the exercise failed.

The question now is how Iraq’s next government will handle the insurgents. Before Sunday, they threatened voters. But U.S. troops led the effort to secure polling stations, while more than half of Iraq’s eligible voters defied insurgent threats and exercised their first real chance for self-empowerment in history.

No one should doubt the sincerity of that step–least of all President George W. Bush and his senior advisers. For, as much as Iraq’s elections stand as a triumph, they also mark the failure of the administration’s original plan for governing the nation. Instead of helping to install pliable Iraqis ready to follow Washington’s lead, Iraq’s next government will be dominated by Shia Arabs, more than two-thirds of whom, according to a recent poll by the reliable Zogby International, want U.S. troops out of Iraq as soon as the new government is in place.

Iraq’s next leaders, however, may want us to stay a little longer, as any abrupt U.S. withdrawal could plunge the nation into a civil war. And, if the way Iraqis voted on Sunday is any indication, such a conflict is already under way. The day before Iraq’s elections, the new White House national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, claimed in a Washington Post op-ed that Iraq’s sectarian splits were being overblown. Yet the turnout was undeniably high in Shia as well as Kurdish areas, while in the Sunni Arab heartland relatively fewer Iraqis chose to vote.

Rather than unite Iraq, the U.S.-backed elections have only sharpened the struggle for political power among the nation’s different population groups. The challenge for both the next Iraqi government and the Bush administration is to find a way to reach out to Iraq’s newly disenfranchised Sunni Arab minority. Not only are areas like the Sunni Triangle the same places where few Iraqis voted, but these same areas remain the main base of Iraq’s ongoing insurgencies.

The Bush administration launched a major military offensive in cities like Fallujah before the elections. Yet, even though U.S. operations killed or drove out many insurgents, they still failed to secure these areas in a way that compelled Sunnis to vote. Some commentators have already asked whether the next government will be able to find and train Iraqi troops to take over more of the fighting from U.S. forces. But these new Iraqi troops may well be drawn from Iranian-trained Shia militias, and their deployment would only further split Iraq’s sectarian sides.

One alternative now would be to try to negotiate with Iraq’s Sunni insurgents instead of trying to eliminate them militarily. Fortunately, the United States already has a precedent for such an approach, even if Bush administration officials still fail to see it.

Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have each pointed to El Salvador’s war-time elections 20 years ago as a supposed model for Iraq. But they forget that El Salvador’s war dragged on for another 10 years after that nation’s first election, and its war ended not through elections at all but only after El Salvador’s U.S.-backed government finally decided to negotiate with El Salvador’s insurgents.

Negotiating with Iraqi insurgents would be even harder. While many if not most Sunni Arabs may well desire peace, foreign insurgents tied to al-Qaida would surely continue using terror to try to derail any possible settlement. Sadly, the war in Iraq may also already be dangerously close to the point at which even a new strategy would not be enough to prevent the nation’s slide into even thicker sectarian bloodshed. If so, U.S. troops would end up stuck in the middle, while fighting at least one side.

It’s hoped senior Bush administration advisers have finally learned something, at least since Sunday. Sectarian divisions do matter in a country where one small group has oppressed others for not only decades but centuries. The new Iraq promises to be more representative, indeed, than any government in that region’s long history. But, instead of being the first step toward democracy, it could yet mark the start of a full-blown civil war.

Kven er dei progressive i Irak?

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(This is a translation into Norwegian of “Who Are the Progressives in Iraq? The Left, the Right and the Islamists,” originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus on September 21, 2004. It is posted on the Norwegian website, dilettant.)

Original story found here.

Ei hending i Irak denne månaden (september 2004, red.anm) vart ikkje nemnd i verken mainstream media eller i den alternative pressa, dette til trass for at hendinga gjev signal om at amerikansk kontroll over Irak si politiske framtid allereie er i ferd med å forsvinna. I august støtta det Kvite Hus etableringa av eit irakisk nasjonalråd med hundre medlemmer frå ulike klanar og ulike etniske- og religiøse grupper, for å avgjera oppbygginga av eit valovervakingsorgan. Denne månaden kom to store politiske parti ? begge sett på som tvilsame av Washington ? best ut i stemmegjevinga.

Mange kritiserer legitimiteten i prosessen Bush-administrasjon vonar å styra i retning nasjonale val i Irak i januar. Dei indirekte vala fann stad under krigstilhøve og AP rapporterer at det var eksplosjonar nær staden der delegatane var samla. Dei irakiske delegatane utvida også talet på viseformenn i nasjonalrådet frå to til fire. Hadde dei ikkje gjort det kunne resultatet har vore endå meir urovekkjande for det Kvite Hus.

Jawad al-Maliki frå Rådet for Islamsk Revolusjon i Irak (SCIRI) flest stemmer, 56 i talet, i avstemminga i september. Denne shiamuslimske gruppa vart kalla eit verktøy for Iran under den USA-leia invasjonen av Irak. Ein annan irakar som er endå mindre attraktiv i Washington sine auge, generalsekretæren i det Irakiske Kommunistpartiet (www.iraqcp.org), Hamid Majid Moussa kom på andre plass med 55 stemmer. Samstundes kom Rasim al-Awadi, delegaten frå den tidlegare CIA-støtta gruppa INA, på tredjeplass med 53 stemmer. På fjerdeplass kom Nasir A?if al-Ani, delegaten frå det Irakiske Islamske Parti, ei sunnigruppe som sympatiserer med den baathist-baserte, antiamerikanske motstanden vest og nord for Baghdad. Han fekk 48 stemmer.

Det lover ikkje vel for Bush-administrasjon å berre ha ein alliert blant fire i dette potensielt svært viktige valovervakingsorganet. Etter at nasjonalrådet var sett ned, men før stemmegjevinga, uttalte det Kvite Hus sin talsmann seg frå Bush sin familieranch i Crawford, Texas: – Valet på nasjonalråd er eit teikn på at det irakiske folket ikkje vil tillata terroristar å stå i vegen for landets demokratiske framtid.

Men kva om valet i Irak tidleg neste år gjev ei regjering ulikt noko Bush-administrasjonen nokon gong har sett føre seg? Den respektere arabisten Juan Cole ved Universitet i Michigan var blant dei fyrste som kommenterte valresultata i nasjonalrådet. Det gjorde han på si eiga nettside www.juancole.com. ? Så, sa han, – denne lista er nok eit bevis på at USA invaderte Irak for å hjelpa ein koalisjon av kommunistar, islamistar og tidlegare baathistiske nasjonalistar til makta. Dersom du hadde sagt noko slikt for tre år sidan ville du blitt ledd ut.

Min fiendes venar

Mange på den amerikanske venstresida ser ut til å vita lite om sine irakiske motpartar, og å skjøna rolla til den irakiske venstresida krev ei nyansert tilnærming. Diverre har den enkle anti-imperialistiske analysa til grupper som International A.N.S.W.E.R. vorte akseptert av fleire progressive organ. Artiklar i The Nation og kommentarar på det uavhengige radioprogrammet Democracy Now har så godt som oversett rolla irakiske progressive spelar. Samstundes har dei retta søkjelys mot, om ikkje forfekta, dei mange ulike irakisk-baserte gruppene som har gjort opprør mot den USA-leia okkupasjonen. Dette har vorte gjort utan at ein har teke seg bryet med å spørja kven desse gruppene er og kva dei tyder for irakarar.

Fleire ting ser no ut til å vera klart rundt Irak-krigen. Den USA-leia invasjonen var det mest uvørne og farlege steget USA har teke sidan krigen i Vietnam. Amerika betaler allereie dyrt og kjem til å betala endå dyrare i framtida for dette. Meir ein tusen amerikanske soldatar er drepne i løpet av vel eit år i ein kampanje som har undergravd amerikansk tryggleik meir enn sjølv presidentkandidat John Kerry klarer å formidla. Internasjonale meiningsmålingar viser at det aldri har vore meir motivlje, om ikkje direkte hat, mot USA rundt om i verda. Dette er akkurat kva al Qa?ida terroristar, ein reell trussel mot USA og andre, treng.

Amerikanske aktivistar som demonstrerte mot krigen i Irak har gjeve eit uvurderleg bidrag gjennom å fortelja resten av verda at millionar av amerikanarar var mot den USA-leia invasjonen. Men fiendens fiende er ikkje med naudsyn ein ven. Å tru det er å klamra seg til ein orwellsk logikk som får amerikanske motstandarar av krigen til å framstå som både uinformerte og som like kyniske som krigstilhengjarane dei kjempar mot. Det ironiske ved Irak-krigen er at Bush-administrasjonen einsidig valde å invadera eit land for å kasta ein leiar som var blant verdas mest forhatte despotar, men likevel klarde å venda hopetal av menneske verda rundt mot USA.

Kven hata Saddam?

Blant Saddam Hussein sine motstandarar har ein alltid funne ingen annan enn Osama bin Laden, som lenge omtalte Saddam Hussein som anten ?vantru? eller som ?ein falsk muslim? nesten kvar einaste gong han nemnde diktatoren i intervju eller fråsegner. Dei mest radikale blant muslimane veit altfor godt at ikkje ei einaste moderne arabisk regjering torturerte og drap så mange muslimar som Saddam sitt Ba?ath-regime. Det er heller ingen andre leiarar i Midtausten som har blodet til så mange kommunistar på hendene som Saddam hadde etter tiår med tortur og drap. Baath-partiet har vore både antikommunistisk og antiislamsk, med etnisk nasjonalisme som fanesak. I Irak var Baath-partiet under Saddam Hussein ei minoritetsregjering. Etnisk arabiske sunnimuslimar har lenge dominert partiet, sjølv om sunniarabarane i dag utgjer maks 17 prosent av det irakiske folket, berre litt fleire enn talet på kvite i Sør-Afrika. Etnisk arabisk shiamuslimar derimot, er nesten like talrike i Irak som svarte i Sør-! Afrika. Alle som er interessert i å styrka dei fattige burde vita at Irak sine shiamuslimske innbyggjarar lenge har vore dei mest ubetydelege i Irak og at det var desse som lei mest under dei USA-støtta FN-sanksjonane. Shiamuslimske menn var lite anna enn kanonføde for Saddam sine mange militære eventyr. Kurdarane, som utgjer 20 prosent av det irakiske folket, hadde til liks med shiamuslimane berre symbolsk innverknad under Saddam.

Motstanden mot Saddam sitt styre tok mange former frå 1979 til 2003, med shiamuslimske, kurdisk-nasjonalistiske og kommunistiske grupper. Kvar av desse mista titusenar av tilhengjarar i brutale aksjonar frå Ba?ath-regimet. Nokre på amerikansk venstreside unnskylda Saddam og sa at hans regime ikkje var verre enn mange andre verda rundt, men Saddam Hussein si framferd fortener ein eigen kategori, han tok i bruk vondskapsfull undertrykking, ofte inklusiv valdtekt og tortur av familiemedlemmer til mistenkte opposisjonelle. Få herskarar nokon stad i verda var så brutale, med eit unntak i den CIA-støtta regjeringa i Guatemala i åttiåra (begge desse regjeringane fekk, er det verd å merka seg, støtte frå USA under Reagan-administrasjonen).

Dei siste åra har ikkje amerikansk venstreside vore dei einaste til å oversjå dei forskjellige irakiske gruppene som lenge hadde kjempa mot Saddam sitt tyranni. Den amerikanske høgresida, nylegast under leiing av Bush-administrasjonen sine nykonservative, oversåg dei også i det dei såg etter irakiske allierte under opptrappinga til den USA-leia invasjonen. I staden for å søkja støtte hos grupper med brei støtte, som den shiamuslimske opposisjonen eller den sekulære venstresida, begge med nærvær i Irak så seint som i 2003, allierte Bush-administrasjonen seg med ei gruppe eksrojalistar leia av den no diskrediterte Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi sin far var solid plassert i den gamle irakiske overklassen og den rikaste mannen i Baghdad i 1958, når Irak sitt kortliva, britisk-innførte monarki vart kasta. Ba?athistane ? etterkvart under leiing av Saddam ? vann den påfølgjande maktkampen, og både shiamajoriteten og Irak si neststørste befolkingsgruppe, kurdarane, heldt fram med å ve ra taparar, utestengd frå! både innverknad og rikdom.

Opprørarane vs. dei revolusjonære

Fleire grupper slost mot dei USA-leia styrkane i Irak i dag, og framferda til amerikanarane har fått mange individuelle irakiske nasjonalistar til å slutta seg til dei. Dei amerikanske overtrampa inkluderer blant anna audmjukinga ? og torturen ? i Abu Ghraib.

Likevel er alle dei organiserte gruppene i den irakiske motstanden reaksjonære krefter av den eine eller den andre typen. Motstanden rundt og mellom byane Falluja, Tikrig og Baghdad i det såkalla ?sunnitriangelet? er leia av tidlegare ba?athistar som vonar å få det gamle minoritetsbaserte diktaturet attende. Som Juan Cole peiker på anerkjenner Nasir A?if al-Ani, sunnidelegaten frå det Irakiske Islamske Parti, ikkje ein gong shiamuslimane som majoritet i Irak (ikkje ein gong dei verste blant afrikaans-minoriteten i apartheidstyrte Sør-Afrika lata som dei svarte var ein minoritet). Nokre, som Naomi Klein i The Nation, ser ut til å ha falle for al-Mahdi-militsen som nyleg kjempa mot amerikanske styrkar i Najaf. Denne militsen er ei laust organisert shiamuslimsk opposisjonsgruppe leia av Muqtada al-Sadr. Han er ein ung mann som arva posisjonen sin etter at faren og to brødre vart drepte av Saddam. Sidan han manglar både modenheiten og treninga til ein eldre shialeiar har han imidlertid freis! ta å lokka til seg tilhengjarar frå meir respekterte shiamuslimske leiarar gjennom å forfekta militant shiamuslimsk lære, inkludert eksplisitt undertrykking av kvinner og homofile.

Den tredje store gruppa av opprørar i Irak består av utanlandske islamistar, tilknytt al Qa?ida, som til liks med både den saudiske kongefamilien og Osama bin Laden praktiserer ei endå meir ekstrem utgåve av Islam, wahabbismen. Denne gruppa sine nylege offer kan inkludera to kidnappa italienske kvinner (desse er no sett fri, red.anm) som arbeida fro den italienske gruppa Ei Bru til Baghdad, til liks med amerikanske antikrigsgrupper som arbeider i Irak ei gruppe som er motstandarar av den amerikanske okkupasjonen. Den amerikanske antikrigsgruppa Iraq Occupation Watch ser ut til å meina at medlemmer av den irakiske motstanden heldt dei fanga og seier på nettsidene sine at kidnapparane burde anerkjenna at dei italienske kvinnene er krigsmotstandar. På den andre sida seiar Jeremy Scahill i Democracy Now og Naomi Klein i The Nation at ei gruppe støtta av vestleg etterretning kan stå bak bortføringane. Slik ymtar dei om at CIA eller andre forsøker å diskreditera irakisk opposisjon.
Irakarane Bush-administrasjonen føretrekk er kanskje sekulære, men knappast meir beundringsverdige folk. Statsminister Iyad Allawi er ein tidlegare ba?athist som forlot partiet midt i syttiåra. Paul McGeough i Sydney Morning Herald rapporterte nyss om at Allawi personleg avretta (med ein pistol) seks irakarar i ein politistasjon i Baghdad like før han vart statsminister, sjølv om det framleis ikkje finst bevis for dette. CV-en hans er heller ikkje imponerande når det gjeld demokrati, han har allereie forbode det qatar-baserte TV-nettverket al-Jazeera og har innført enkelte unntakslover.

Verken motstandsgruppene mange på den amerikanske venstresida eller styresmaktene forfekta av den amerikanske høgresida ser ut til å reflektera oppfattingane og framtidshåpa til storparten av irakarane, som ser ut til å håpa på grupper som er uavhengige av både Saddam sitt styre og av den meir og meir diktatoriske Allawi-regjeringa. Blant deira moglegheiter finn ein moderate shiamuslimske grupper og sekulære venstregrupper. Gjennom deira leiing kan fleirtalet av irakarar håpa på auka innverknad for fyrste gong i historia.

Diverre ser vanlege irakarar ut til å ha vorte nær gløymd av både den amerikanske venstre- og den amerikanske høgresida. Irakarar må verta verdsette for det dei er, ikkje som bønder i eit partipolitisk spel. Slik sjåvinisme kan kanskje ventast frå ?Amerika fyrst?-talsmenn på høgrevingen, men kan ikkje forsvarast frå ein samvitsfull progressiv. Det er ikkje rart at mange på den amerikanske venstresida i staden for å sjå på Irak sin komplekse politiske realitet i staden klamrar seg til den gode kjensla frå enkle slagord.

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Denne artikkelen er skrive av Frank Smyth, ein amerikansk frilansjournalist som blant anna har rapportert frå geriljakrigar i El Salvador, Rwanda og Irak. I 1991 dekka han opprøret mot Saddam Hussein sitt regime, vart seinare teke til fange og sat to veker fengsla i Abu Ghraib. Artikkelen vart fyrst publisert i Foreign Policy In Focus si september-utgåve. Du finn nettsida til Frank Smyth på www.FrankSmyth.com og originalutgåva av artikkelen på www.fpif.org/papers/0409progiraq.html. Dilettant.no har fått løyve til å omsetja og publisera artikkelen.

Chi sono i progressisti in Iraq?

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The article below in Italian, “Who are the Progressives in Iraq? The Left, the Right and the Islamists,” was originally published in English by Foreign Policy in Focus on September 21, 2004. It was translated by Bianca Cerri of ReporterAssociati (www.reporterassociati.org), the independent Italian freelance journalist group based in Rome that is linked to IndyMedia (www.indymedia.org).

Original story found here.

Sia la stampa “alternativa” che quella ufficiale hanno dimenticato di riportare un evento che dimostra come il controllo americano sul futuro dell’Iraq sta forse tramontando.

Ad agosto, la Casa Bianca ha sostenuto la nascita di un Consiglio Nazionale Iracheno, formato da oltre cento gruppi tribali, etnici, religiosi, nella speranza di influenzare la composizione di un corpo elettorale. Durante il mese scorso, due grandi partiti politici, entrambi guardati da sempre con sospetto a Washington, hanno guadagnato terreno.

Molti accusano l’amministrazione Bush di voler pregiudicare le elezioni nazionali in Iraq, che si terranno a gennaio. Le elezioni indirette sono avvenute durante la guerra e l’Associated Press ha scritto che le bombe esplodevano accanto alla sala dei Convegni dove erano radunati i delegati. Fra l’altro, il numero dei vice-presidenti è salito da due a quattro. Una extrema razio per togliere un pò di potere a quello già grande della Casa Bianca.

Le votazioni di settembre hanno portato alla vittoria il delegato della Suprema Assemblea per la Rivoluzione Islamica in Iraq, Jawad al-Maliki, che ha preso 56 gruppi. Il gruppo sciita che rappresenta è stato usato come un giocattolo da Donald Rumsfeld durante l’invasione dell’Iraq.
Uno degli iracheni meno graditi a Washington è il Segretario Generale del Partito Comunista Iracheno (www.iraqcp.org), Hamid Majid Moussa, che ha preso 55 voti. L’Iraqi National Accord, presediuto da Rasim al-Awadi, un tempo sostenuto dalla CIA, assieme al suo capo, Iyad Allawi, vicino all’amministrazione Bush, che lo voleva primo ministro, ha avuto invece 53 voti.
Nasir A’if al-Ani, delegato del Partito Islamico Iracheno, gruppo sunnita ma oggi simpatico alla resistenza anti-americana a maggioranza Ba’athista, che opera ad ovest e a nord di Bagdad, è arrivato quarto, con 48 voti.

Ad ogni modo, l’elezione di uno qualsiasi di questi corpi elettorali non è un buon segno per Bush. Dopo la nascita del Consiglio, ma prima del voto che ha fatto prevalere i quattro rappresentati indicati, il portavoce della Casa Bianca, Scott McClennan, aveva dichiarato che la selezione del Consiglio era un segnale di avvertimento ai terroristi a non spingersi oltre.

Cosa accadrebbe se dalle prossime elezioni in Iraq dovesse uscire un governo diverso da quello che l’amministrazione Bush si aspettava. Juan Cole, che è tra i più grandi conoscitori di cultura araba ed insegna all’Università del Michigan, ha scritto nel suo blog che sarebbe una vera ironia se, dopo aver invaso l’Iraq, gli Stati Uniti si ritrovassero con un governo iracheno fatto di Comunisti, islamisti e Nazionalisti ex-Ba’thist.

GLI AMICI DEI MIEI NEMICI

La sinistra americana non conosce bene le molte realtà dell’Iraq e farebbe forse bene a raffinare la sua analisi. I gruppi come A.N.S.W.E.R. non vanno oltre una tremula analisi basata sull’anti-americanismo più sciatto. Gli editoriali di The Nation, come i reportages sulla radio libera che trasmette “Democracy Now” hanno invece ignorato completamente i progressisti iracheni e si sono focalizzati sulla resistenza anti-Usa, spesso esaltandola, senza però chiedersi chi siano i gruppi che la compongono e cosa rappresentino per l’Iraq.

Ormai, molti aspetti della guerra in Iraq sono chiari. L’invasione USA è stata il passo più avventato e pericoloso dai tempi del Vietnam e l’America sta già pagando caramente e che ancora più caramente pagherà in futuro. In meno di un anno, la guerra ha fatto saltare la sicurezza anche in America, oltre ad aver ucciso più di mille soldati. John Kerry ha faticato a trovare parole giuste per descrivere la situazione. Gli Stati Uniti hanno suscitato tanto odio da aver battuto ogni record storico (secondo le statistiche internazionale). E questo è esattamente il clima in cui i terroristi di al-Quaida, che sono davvero una minaccia per l’America, desiderano.

Gli attivisti americani che hanno protestato contro la guerra hanno dato un incalcolabile contributo, facendo sapere al mondo che milioni di persone in America non volevano l’invasione. Ma non significa che il nemico di un nemico sia un amico. Avere un’opinione diversa significa abbracciare una logica “orwelliana” che rischia di far apparire i pacifisti non solo male informati, ma anche cinici quanto i sostenitori della guerra contro i quali si battono. Per ironia, l’amministrazione Bush, decidendo di invadere l’Iraq e di fargli la guerra per rovesciare un dittatore tra i più odiati al mondo, si è attirata l’odio di quasi tutti i paesi.

CHI SONO QUELLI CHE ODIANO SADDAM?

Tra i denigratori di Saddam Hussein c’è sicuramente Osama Bin Laden, che rideva del leader iracheno definendolo “infedele” o “falso musulmano”. I musulmani radicali sanno infatti che nessun altro governo arabo ha assassinato altri musulmani quanto il regime Ba’athista di Saddam. Nessun altro ha torturato ed assassinato tanti comunisti quanto ha fatto Saddam nei lunghi anni del suo regime. Il Partito Nazionale della Rinascita era un partito contrario sia ai comunisti che agli islamisti, dedito soltanto al nazionalismo etnico. Voleva soprattutto mettere le minoranze al governo. Per tanti anni, è stato dominato dai Sunniti, che sono soltanto il 17{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} della Resistenza irachena, poco più dei bianchi in Sud Africa. Gli Sciiti, invece, rientrano nella categoria dei meno abbienti in assoluto ed hanno sofferto più di tutti durante l’embargo. La bassa macelleria di Saddam li considerava carne per foderare i cannoni durante le varie avventure militari. I curdi non hanno avuto più fortuna: pur essendo oltre il 20{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} della popolazione, non contavano nulla per Saddam.

Durante il regime di Saddam, negli anni tra il 1979 ed il 2003, la resistenza ha assunto varie forme: sciiti islamici, nazionalisti Curdi e comunisti. E le vittime sono state migliaia, a prescindere dal gruppo di appartenenza, a causa della brutale contro-insurrezione voluta dal governo Ba’athista.

Gran parte della sinistra americana sosteneva che, in fondo, il regime di Saddam non era peggiore degli altri. Invece, Saddam Hussein rappresenta una categoria a parte e si è servito di una repressione viscida, che comprendeva tortura e violenza carnale per i membri delle famiglie di sospetti dissidenti. Sono pochi i governanti che hanno raggiunto lo stesso grado di brutalità, a parte, forse, il Guatemala nel 1980. (L’America, ad ogni modo, ha sostenuto entrambi i governi tramite l’amministrazione Reagan).

Non è stata solo la sinistra ad ignorare i vari gruppi iracheni che hanno resistito alla tirannia di Saddam. La destra, sotto la guida di Bush, a sua volta, ha fatto lo stesso al momento della ricerca di alleati per la pianificazione strategica del 2003. Invece di prendere contatti con i gruppi contrari a Saddam, come i musulmani sciiti o la storica resistenza di sinistra, che avevano ancora clandestini armati nei quadri in Iraq, l’amministrazione Bush si è rivolta agli ex-monarchici guidati da Ahmed Chalabi, oggi uscito dalla grazia degli Stati Uniti. Chalabi, che viene dalla vecchia classe dirigente ed è figlio di uno degli uomini più ricchi del paese, che già nel 1958 aveva accumulato una grande fortuna, era un uomo molto in vista durante la breve monarchia imposta dagli inglesi. Poi, è arrivato Saddam, che, con un’azione rivoluzionaria, prese il potere, dal quale restarono esclusi sia la maggioranza sciita che i curdi.

LA RESISTENZA CONTRO I RIVOLUZIONARI

Molti hanno preso le armi contro le forze guidate dagli americani, che sono in questo momento in Iraq e, da parte loro, gli USA hanno avuto la mano pesante. Il che non è dispiaciuto ad alcuni nazionalisti.

Le irruzioni delle truppe nelle case, i maltrattamenti alle donne, i soldati che terrorizzavano i bambini, gli spari nei quartieri popolari che hanno ucciso molti civili, la tortura, le umiliazioni nel carcere di Abu Ghraib sono stati il risultato.

Intanto, a Fallujah, Tikrit e Bagdad, il cosiddetto triangolo sunnita, si andava organizzando la resistenza, guidata dai Ba’hatisti che aspirano a riportare al potere la vecchia dittatura composta da una minoranza. Secondo Juan Cole, il Consiglio Nazionale Islamico avverte la maggioranza Sci’a come una minoranza, cosa che non farebbe neppure l’afrikaner più recalcitrante nel Sud Africa dell’apartheid. Altri, come Naomi Klein, che scrive su The Nation, vedono bene le milizie di al-Mahdi, che recentemente si sono scontrate con i Marines. Si tratta di una milizia concepita alla rinfusa, di marchio Shiita, guidata da Muqtada al-Sadr. Al- Sadr, che è giovane, ha perso due fratelli ed il padre per mano di Saddam. Non è esperto nè ha la maturità di esponente clericale ed ha cercato di guadagnarsi il sostegno proponendo l’arruolamento militare degli esponenti più in vista dell’Islam sciita e predicando la repressione dei gay e delle donne.

Il terzo elemento di resistenza stabile all’interno dell’Iraq è composto da membri forestieri di al-Qaida, che, come Osama Bin Laden e la famiglia reale dell’Arabia Saudita, praticano una forma di islamismo ancora più rigida, setta Wahaabismo. Sono forse loro gli autori delle due donne italiane rapite, appartenenti all’organizzazione Un Ponte Per Bagdad, che, come gli anti-militaristi americani, si oppone all’occupazione americana. L’Iraq Occupation Watch crede di sì e, sul sito web ha scritto che i rapitori devono tenere conto che si tratta di due donne contrarie alla guerra.

Il commentatore di Democracy Now, Jeremy Scahill, e Naomi Klein, hanno invece detto sul Guardian che le due ragazze sarebbero state prese da un gruppo sostenuto dall’intelligence occidentale o dalla CIA, che avrebbe rapito le due donne per screditare l’opposizione irachena.

Gli iracheni favorevoli a Bush, come Ilyad Allawi, un ex- Ba’athista che ha lasciato il Partito a metà degli anni Settanta, non sono migliori. In un comando di polizia di Bagdad, Allawi uccise sei persone a colpi di pistola poco prima di essere nominato primo ministro, anche se non venne mai incriminato, come ha scritto Paul McGeough sul Sydney Morning Herald. Come credenziali, Allawi non possiede un gran che. Ha già oscurato al-Jazeera, la televisione qatariota, ed ha imposto leggi marziali.

E’ bene ricordare che neppure i gruppi di resistenti osannati dalla sinistra americana, nè il governo imposto dagli americani riflettono le aspirazioni degli iracheni, che sperano di affrancarsi sia dalla tirannia del passato come dal governo sempre più dittatoriale di Allawi.
Il popolo iracheno vedrebbe con favore un gruppo sciita moderato al governo del paese, o la sinistra storica, che darebbe al popolo la possibilità di essere per la prima volta artefice del proprio destino.

Sfortunatamente, gli iracheni del popolo sono stati ignorati dalla sinistra americana ma anche dalla destra. Non vogliono continuare ad essere le pedine di un gioco politico sciovinistico che potrà essere caro alle destre, ma che nessun rappresentante cosciente della sinistra progressista dovrebbe accettare. Eppure, la sinistra USA si accontenta di politiche basate sugli slogan e non sulla complessa e contraddittoria realtà dell’Iraq.

FRANK SMYTH è un giornalista freelance che ha “praticato” la guerrilla di sinistra nel Salvador, in Iraq e in Rwanda. E’ stato testimone diretto della rivolta contro il regime di Saddam Hussein nel 1991 ed è stato imprigionato nel carcere di Asbu Ghraib. Ha scritto questo articolo per Foreign Policy in Focus.

Hasty elections could divide Iraq

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Original story found here.

No matter which candidate wins in November, he will face his first challenge in Iraq.

President George W. Bush keeps promising that Iraq’s first national elections will be held in January, even if they only take place, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said, in “three-quarters or four- fifths” of the nation. Sen. John Kerry, meanwhile, has yet to articulate any meaningful position on Iraq, as both candidates are reluctant to raise issues they can’t resolve.

But we cannot afford to ignore Iraq’s rising tide of violence. Yesterday, a rocket attack hit the Sheraton Hotel in Baghdad. And, if the Bush administration goes ahead quickly toward elections, the president may end up doing something that he promised he would never do: breaking up Iraq into three parts largely along ethnic and religious lines.

Of course, this is not what the administration had in mind for Iraq. But it will be one sure result of any attempt to hold elections in the middle of an escalating insurgent war. It would be risky if not impossible to hold elections in the Sunni Triangle, where most of the insurgency is based. But, if these areas are excluded from the voting, Iraq will be left with two noncontiguous, self-governing entities by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shia majority in the south.

The insurgency itself is not what many may think. Rather than enjoy either broad geographic reach or diverse popular support, most of the armed resistance is limited to one part of Iraq and is being mostly carried out by one population group. Over the past month, a private security firm documented more than 2,300 attacks against U.S.-led forces stretching across the entire nation.

But about 80 percent of the attacks were concentrated in [or around] the Sunni Triangle along both the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys and in Baghdad itself.

There was only one attack last month, for example, in the southern city of Najaf, as by then the rebellion led by Muqtada al-Sadr, the young son of a cleric killed by Saddam Hussein, was already over. The Shia resistance declined after his al-Mahdi militia suffered heavy casualties and the more respected, elder surviving cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, brokered a cease-fire. Now al-Sistani is demanding nationwide elections, while al-Sadr has gone back and forth about whether he will disarm his militia and will participate in the January elections.

Sporadic Shia resistance continues in the Sadr city slum of Baghdad, but most of the remaining insurgency is concentrated in the Sunni Triangle.

For a while, Rumsfeld and others tried to blame foreign fighters tied to al-Qaida for most of the violence in Iraq. Today, these foreign Islamists remain active out of proportion to their relatively small numbers inside Iraq, and they are responsible, indeed, for many recent beheadings of kidnapped Westerners.

But by now even Rumsfeld’s own intelligence analysts agree that the bulk of the Iraqi resistance is not only homegrown but also deeply rooted among Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority population.

Even though ethnic Arabs of the mainstream Sunni Muslim religion are a majority in most Arab nations, they are a minority in Iraq of, at most, 17 percent of the population. Both the Kurds in the north, who constitute about 20 percent of Iraqis, and the Shia Arabs in the slums around Baghdad and in the south, who make up at least 60 percent of Iraqis, are more numerous. But it is Sunni Arabs, albeit through more rural tribes under Hussein than before, who have long dominated the region.

Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority has little incentive to compete in elections with other population groups, as introducing any pluralism into Iraq would only end the Sunnis’ long-standing monopoly on power. Combined with the heavy-handedness of U.S. forces, killing many civilians including women and children in cities like Fallujah and Samarra, the Sunni Arab insurgency has grown even deeper roots throughout the Sunni Triangle — which really has only two sides, along the Euphrates and Tigris. The insurgency also extends north along the Tigris as far as Mosul into areas dominated by Christian Arabs, who also rose to power under Hussein.

Even the best possible deployment of U.S. firepower and tactics cannot prevent the specter of moderate Iraqis being blown apart as they try to vote, even if it is possible to hold secure elections in most of the country.

Elections could well lead to more self-government for the “four-fifths” of Iraqis who live in either the south or the north. But these two model areas would still be split by a limited but raging insurgency alongside them and in between.

The Bush administration has backed itself into a corner. If elections are not held across Iraq, as al-Sistani is demanding, Washington risks provoking a broad Shia insurgency that would be even harder to handle than all the anti-American resistance there so far. Yet, holding elections while the Sunni insurgency is raging can only lead to the de facto breakup of Iraq.

Arguably, the administration has no choice, as it must keep its promise to Iraqis to hold elections. But, through elections in most but not all of the country, President Bush will be breaking the strategic promise he made not to divide the Iraqi nation. Rather than unite the nation under a legitimate government, wartime elections will split Iraq into three enclaves without any foreseeable plan to bring them back together.

Quienes son los Progresistas en Irak?

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This article in Spanish, “Who are the Progressives in Iraq? The Left, the Right and the Islamists,” was originally published in English by Foreign Policy in Focus on September 21, 2004. It was translated by Alexander Renderos of the editorial group, Raíces, based in San Salvador, through DesdeElSalvador (www.desdeelsalvador.com.sv).

Un evento en Baghdad pasó sin ser reportado por la tradicional prensa escrita, e incluso la “alternativa”, a pesar de que ello implica que el poder de Estados Unidos sobre el futuro político de Irak puede estar menguando. En Agosto, La Casa Blanca apoyó el establecimiento del Consejo Nacional Iraquí compuesto por 100 iraquíes provenientes de grupos religiosos, tribales y étnicos, en su esfuerzo por influenciar la composición del Cuerpo Electoral de Vigilancia Iraquí. No obstante en este mes (septiembre), dos grandes partidos políticos, ambos por mucho tiempo vistos con sospecha por Washington, salieron aventajados en la votación.

Muchos critican la legitimidad del proceso sobre el cual la Administración Bush ha depositado sus esperanzas para conducir a Irak a las elecciones generales en enero del 2005. Las indirectas elecciones acontecieron bajo condiciones de guerra, y la Associated Press reportó que morteros explotaron cerca del lugar de la convención en Bagdad donde los delegados se reunían. Los delegados iraquíes también extendieron de dos a cuatro el número de puestos para la vicepresidencia en el Consejo Nacional. De no haberlo hecho los resultados habrían sido aún más preocupantes para Washington.

En la votación de Septiembre, el delegado perteneciente a La Asamblea Suprema por la Revolución Islámica en Irak, Jawad al-Maliki, salió primero con 56 votos. Este es un grupo shiíta al que el Secretario de Defensa, Donald Rumsfeld, denunció de ser una herramienta de Irán durante la invasión de Irak liderada por Estados Unidos. Y otro iraquí, aún menos atractivo para Washington, el Secretario General del Partido Comunista Iraquí, Hamid Majid Moussa, resultó segundo con 55 votos. Mientras tanto, Rasin al-Awadi, el delegado perteneciente al Acuerdo Nacional Iraquí, cuyo grupo en un tiempo fuera respaldado por la CIA, y cuyo lider Iyad Allawi fuera también apoyado por la Administración Bush como candidato a Primer Ministro Iraquí, salió en tercer lugar con 53 votos. Nasir A’if al-Ani, el delegado perteneciente al Partido Islámico Iraquí, un grupo sunita con simpatías por la resistencia baatista operando en el oeste y norte de Bagdad, resultó cuarto con 48 votos.

Cualquiera sea el resultado, contar con un solo un aliado electo de una lista de cuatro asientos dentro de un potencialmente importante Cuerpo Electoral de Vigilancia, no augura ningún bien para la Administración Bush. Después de conformarse el ahora Consejo Nacional Iraquí y con anterioridad de emitir su voto, el vocero de La Casa Blanca, Scott McClellan, durante una estadía en el rancho de los Bush en Crawford, Texas, declaró: “La elección del Consejo es una muestra que el pueblo iraquí no permitirá que elementos terroristas se interpongan en el camino de su futuro democrático”.

Pero que tal si las próximas elecciones de enero conllevan a la elección de un gobierno no respaldado por la Administración Bush. El respetado arabista de la Universidad de Michigan, Juan Cole, estuvo entre los primeros en reportar los resultados del Consejo Nacional Iraquí. En su sitio web: www.juancole.com afirmó: “Esta lista es una evidencia más de que EE.UU invadió Iraq para poner en el poder a una coalición de comunistas, islámicos y ex nacionalistas baatistas. Si usted hubiera mencionado semejante cosa hace unos tres años, se hubieran reído de su persona”.

LOS AMIGOS DE MIS ENEMIGOS

Muchos norteamericanos de izquierda parecen conocer muy poco acerca de sus similares iraquíes, ya que para entender su rol se requiere un acercamiento variado y delicado. Lamentablemente, análisis de grupos anti-imperialistas como los de la internacional A.N.S.E.W.R, ya se han dejado insinuar en sitios de alternativas progresistas. Despachos y columnas en The Nation, asi como reportajes y comentarios en el independiente y sindicado programa de radio “Democracy Now”, no han hecho más que ignorar el papel de iraquíes progresistas, al tiempo que han destacado el papel de los varios grupos de resistencia iraquí que luchan en contra de la invasión de Estados Unidos, sin preocuparse por averiguar quienes son estos grupos y lo que representan para el pueblo de Irak.

Por ahora, muchas cosas acerca de la guerra en Irak son muy claras: la invasión de Estados Unidos ha sido el paso más imprudente y peligroso desde la guerra de Vietnam por lo cual ya paga caro, previéndose que para el futuro, el precio será aún mucho mayor debido a su imprudente acción. Más de mil soldados estadounidenses han muerto en poco más de un año en una campaña que ha debilitado profundamente la seguridad de EE.UU, y lo que el candidato demócrata por la presidencia John Kerry, se las pueda haber arreglado por articular. Según encuestas de opinión pública internacional, nunca han existido sentimientos de tanto resentimiento e incluso desprecio en contra de Los Estados Unidos alrededor del mundo como ahora. Y es éste exactamente la clase de ambiente en el que grupos terroristas como AlQeda prospera.

Activistas estadounidenses que se manifestarón en contra de la guerra en Irak, hicieron una invaluable contribución permitiendo que el resto del mundo se enterara que millones de estadounidenses se oponían a la invasión liderada por EE.UU. Pero el enemigo del enemigo de uno, no es necesariamente su amigo. Pensar lo contrario es abrazar la lógica Orwelliana que hace de los estadounidenses anti-guerra lucirse, no solo como mal informados, sino que al mismo tiempo tan cínicos como los pro-guerra. La ironía de la guerra en Irak es que la Administración Bush hizo una decisión unilateral para destronar del poder a uno de los líderes más despreciados de entre los déspotas del mundo, pero al hacerlo unilateralmente puso en su contra a incontables personas alrededor del mundo.

¿ QUIEN ODIABA A SADDAM?

Dentro de los detractores de Saddam se incluyen siempre no otro más que Bin Laden, que hace tiempo se mofó del líder iraquí calificándolo de “infiel” y “falso musulmán” durante toda ocasión que brindó entrevistas ó en declaraciones escritas. Pero de hecho, aún los musulmanes más radicales, saben muy bien que no otro gobierno árabe moderno, torturó y asesinó a tantos musulmanes como el régimen baatista de Husseim. Y por igual, ningún líder del Medio Oriente ha torturado y asesinado a tantos comunistas como el régimen de Saddam.

El Partido árabe Renacimiento Nacionalista [o] Baatista ha sido anti-comunista y anti-islámico, y desvergonzadamente ha defendido al nacionalismo étnico. Arabes étnicos de la preponderante fe sunnita por mucho tiempo han dominado el Partido baatista, a pesar que aún hoy solo constituyen un 17{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} de la población iraquí, siendo este porcentaje solo un pequeño escaño por arriba de la población blanca de Sur Africa.

Arabes étnicos de la secta Shiita Musulmán mientras tanto, son casi tan numerosos en Irak como los negros de Sur Africa. Alguien con cierto interés en hacer algo por los pobres debería saber que los shiítas han sido los más indigentes de los iraquíes, y los que más sufrieron durante el embargo de las Naciones Unidas apoyado por Los Estados Unidos. Shiítas masculinos siempre fueron poco menos que pólvora de cañón para las aventuras militaristas de Saddam. Y al igual que los shiítas, los kurdos de Irak, que son un 20{2ef06ca992448c50a258763a7da34b197719f7cbe0b72ffbdc84f980e5f312af} de la población, jamás disfrutaron más de lo que se puede denominar como una representación simbólica bajo el régimen de Saddam.

La resistencia a Saddam Husseim tomó muchas formas desde 1979 al 2003, con grupos en contra del derrocado líder organizándose desde shiítas islámicos y kurdos nacionalistas, hasta líneas del Partido Comunista. Cada uno de estos grupos perdió decenas de miles de partidarios durante las barridas contrainsurgentes del régimen baatista. Y algunos estadounidenses de izquierda pidieron disculpas por el régimen de Saddam, diciendo que no era peor que otros en el mundo. Pero el comportamiento de Saddam merece una categorización única, por sus procedimientos viciosos de represión que a menudo incluía la tortura y violación de familiares de personas sospechosos de ser disidentes. Pocos gobernantes han sido tan brutales en cualquier parte del mundo con excepción del gobierno guatemalteco apoyado por la CIA en los años 80. Ambos gobiernos, el guatemalteco y el de Saddam, fueron clandestinamente respaldados por la CIA durante la administración Reagan.

En años recientes, izquierdistas estadounidenses no fueron los únicos en ignorar a los varios grupos iraquíes que por mucho tiempo resistieron la tiranía de Saddam. La derecha estadounidense liderada por neoconservadores de la administración Bush, también ignoraron a estos grupos de resistencia cuando buscaron aliados iraquíes durante la escalada de la invasión en el 2003. En lugar de abrazar a una amplia base de grupos anti-Saddam como la oposición musulmán shiíta o la secular resistencia izquierdista, los cuales mantenían cuadros armados y clandestinos dentro de Irak aún a finales del 2003, La Administración Bush se alió con grupos de ex-monarquistas liderados por el ahora desacreditado Ahmed Chalabi. Un sólido miembro de la vieja clase dominante, el padre de Chalabi era el hombre más millonario de Bagdad en 1958, tiempo en el cual la efímera monarquía impuesta por los británicos fue derrocada. Eventualmente los baatistas comandados por Saddam sobresalieron en la consiguiente lucha por el poder, y tanto la mayoría shiíita así como los kurdos que conforman la segunda población más extensa de Irak, quedaron excluidos de la riqueza y el poder.

LA RESISTENCIA CONTRA LOS REVOLUCIONARIOS

Hay varias facciones que combaten ahora contra las fuerzas de EE.UU, y la mano dura de la ocupación estadounidense ha incitado a nacionalistas iraquíes a unírseles. Los abusos estadounidenses han incluido desde allanamientos a viviendas con las tropas a menudo maltratando a mujeres y aterrando niños, tiroteos en poblaciones vulnerables que han causado bajas civiles, y la humillación y tortura de iraquiís dentro de la prisión de Abu Ghraib.

Sin embargo, todos los grupos organizados en la resistencia iraquí son fuerzas reaccionarias de una u otra clase. La resistencia alrededor y entre las ciudades de Falluja, Tikrit y Bagdad en el llamado “triángulo sunita” es liderada por ex baatistas que aspiran en retomar al poder a la minora dictactorial. Como lo señala Juan Cole, Nasir A’if al-Ani, el delegado sunita ante el Consejo Nacional Iraqui por el Partido Islámico Iraqui, ni siquiera reconoce a la población shiíta como una mayoría en Iraq. (Ni siquiera los más recalcitrantes “afrikaners” en el aparthied en Sur Africa pretendieron que la población negra era una minoría).

Mientras tanto algunos como Naomi Klein del periódico “The Nation”, parecen haber caído ingenuamente al lado de la milicia al-Mahdi que recientemente combatió con los marinos estadounidenses en Najaf. La milicia al-Mahdi es un grupo de oposición holgadamente organizado y liderado por Muqtada Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr es un hombre que heredó su rol después de que su padre y dos de sus hermanos fueran asesinados por Saddam. Careciendo tanto de la madurez y el entrenamiento como clérigo de mayor rango, Al-Sadr ha tratado de atraer dentro de sus partidarios a clérigos shiítas de mayor peso, mediante la aplicación de los principios fundamentales del islam shiíta que incluye la explícita represión de homosexuales y mujeres.

El tercer elemento considerable de resistencia en Irak está compuesto por islámicos extranjeros miembros de AlQeda, tanto como la real familia saudita y Bin Laden, practican la versión más extremista del islám conocida como “Wahaabism”. Las últimas victimas de este grupo pueden haber incluido a las dos ya liberadas pacifistas italianas que trabajan para la ONG italiana “Un Puente a Bagdad”, y que al igual que los otros grupos anti-guerra estadounidenses trabajando en Irak está explícitamente opuesto a la ocupación estadounidense. Y en la otra mano, tanto Jeremy Scahill de “Democracy Now” y Naomi Klein de The Nation, han escrito en The Guardian de Londres, que un grupo de inteligencia apoyado por Occidente pudo haber estado detrás de los secuestros, sugiriendo que la CIA u otros, raptaron a las mujeres para desacreditar a la oposición iraquí.

Los iraquíes favorecidos por la Administración Bush pueden ser seculares pero apenas son personas admirables. El Primer Ministro, Iyad Allawi es un ex baatista que dejó el Partido Baath a mediados de 1970. Paul McGeough del Sydney Morning Herald, reportó que con un revolver, Allawi personalmente ejecutó a seis iraquíes en la estación policial de Bagdad justo antes de convertirse en Primer Ministro. Sin embargo ninguna prueba de este crimen está próxima por el momento. Y las credenciales democráticas de Allawi tampoco son impresionantes: prohibió el trabajo de la cadena de televisión al-Jazeera, y ha impuesto ciertas formas de ley marcial.

Ni los grupos de resistencia aclamados por los muchos estadounidenses de izquierda, o los partidos de gobiernos apoyados por la derecha, parecen reflejar los puntos de vistas y aspiraciones de la mayoría del pueblo iraquí, que mejor parecen sustentar sus esperanzas en el surgimientos de grupos muy independientes del pasado régimen de Saddam y del creciente gobierno ditactorial de Allawi. Estas posibilidades incluyen a grupos shiítas moderados y seculares izquierdistas, a través del los cuales el pueblo iraquí espera acceder al poder por primera vez en su historia.

Desafortunadamente, la mayoría del pueblo iraquí parece haber sido olvidada, tanto por la izquierda como por la derecha norteamericana. Los iraquíes tienen que ser valorados por lo que son, no como peones en alguna agenda política partidaria. Semejante chovinismo pueden esperarse de extremistas derechistas de “America-First”, pero también semejante postura a puras penas es defendible por cualquier conciente de ser progresista. Así que no es ninguna sorpresa que en lugar de ver la sumamente contradictoria y a la vez compleja realidad política de Irak, muchos estadounidenses de izquierda mejor han preferido aferrarse a la comodidad que proviene del simple uso del slogan.

Frank Smyth es un periodista freelance que estuvo “embedded” (incrustado) con las guerrillas izquierdistas en El Salvador, Irak y Rwanda. En 1991 cubrió los levantamientos en contra del régimen de Saddam Hussein en Irak, lugar donde fue capturado para luego permanecer cautivo por dos semanas en la prisión iraquí de Abub Ghraib. Es colaborador de Raíces.

(Traducción Alexander Renderos, miembro grupo editor de Raíces)